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*C.J.Q. 470 Abstract: The jurisdiction to award security for costs against an impecunious company
established by statute in the reign of Queen Victoria is scheduled for repeal on October 1, 2009. The
Victorian statute made assumptions about categories of business entity and the type of costs order
against which security is ordered which are now archaic, and incorporates elaborate and redundant
phrases such as “credible testimony”, but is also of wider application, including, by a sidewind, forms
of proceeding, such as small claims, from which the procedural jurisdiction to award security under
the CPR is explicitly excluded. Case law derived from the statute, as to the application of the
jurisdiction to interim applications and counterclaims and as to the operation of the discretion, is still
applied without question to the procedural jurisdiction, despite the “new procedural code” of the CPR.
This article considers the continuing influence of the statutory jurisdiction, assessing the impact of its
repeal.
Introduction
The statutory jurisdiction created in Joint Stock Companies Act 1857 s.24 and, for the next few
months, still found in Companies Act 1985 s.726 (“the statutory jurisdiction”) to award security for
costs against an impecunious company is based on two concepts: of costs following the event and of
the “unwilling defendant”, obliged to seek exoneration at the risk of the costs of doing so being
irrecoverable.
The likelihood of a once and for all single award of costs following the event of the defendant's
success at trial has, however, decreased significantly in *C.J.Q. 471 recent years. Pre-emptive cost
capping1 ; issue-based costs orders sharing costs between the parties in proportions not predictable
before the trial; CPR Pt 36; before the event and after the event insurance; recoverability of success
fees and insurance premia2 all militate against an attempt to calculate an appropriate amount of
security at a stage prior to trial.
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Even the unwilling defendant is now often a fiction. Which of the parties is the defendant ostensibly
entitled to apply for an award may be a matter of coincidence3 or a race to the issue office.4
Nevertheless, the wording of, and case law derived from, the statutory jurisdiction remains a
significant influence on its parallel in CPR r.25.13(2)(c) (“the procedural jurisdiction”) introduced in
2000. It is the analysis, application *C.J.Q. 472 and interrelationship of these apparently co-extensive
jurisdictions which forms the basis of this paper. The analysis is particularly significant because
Companies Act 1985 s.726 is scheduled for repeal on October 1, 2009 under Companies Act 2006.
This paper considers the continuing power of the statutory jurisdiction, assessing the impact of its
repeal.5
The impecunious corporate claimant6
Introduction: “impecunious” and “corporate”
The power to award security for the defendant's prospective costs against an impecunious corporate
plaintiff, when there is no such jurisdiction in respect of natural persons,7 has long been justified,
“otherwise the privilege of limited liability could be used in an oppressive and unfair way, allowing
those with means behind companies with no assets to indulge in a kind of fail safe litigation free of the
risk of having to shoulder a successful defendant's costs and leaving defendants who had only and
successfully sought to defend themselves to carry the costs burden of that defence”.8
Professor Zuckerman, in addition, suggests that this risk places pressure (in the absence of an order
for security) on the defendant to settle the claim disadvantageously.9 Although the problem of limited
liability is not now perceived to be the sole justification for the existence of the jurisdiction,10 *C.J.Q.
473 the existence of the jurisdiction is now entrenched. Nevertheless, it remains subject to a number
of constraints.
First, one should define what is meant by a “corporate claimant”. The statutory jurisdiction applies, as
one might expect given its genesis, only to a limited company. In the 21st century, however, there is a
plethora of forms of business organisation. A response might be to subject each to the statutory
jurisdiction on a piecemeal basis, as with the limited liability partnership (LLP).11 The modern
procedural jurisdiction, in CPR r.25.13(2)(c), however, adopts an umbrella approach by applying to, “a
company or other body (whether incorporated inside or outside Great Britain)”. Whilst an LLP has
acquired the status of a body corporate by statute,12 the procedural jurisdiction has been held to
include a company with unlimited liability.13 References to “incorporation” indicate that it was not
intended to include unincorporated “other bodies”14 such as clubs and associations or partnerships.15
The breadth of the procedural jurisdiction is, therefore, less different from that of the statute than it
might at first appear. Nevertheless, a trades union--explicitly prevented from registration as a
company16 and therefore outside the statute, but expressly permitted to sue and be sued in its own
name17 --might logically, I suggest, be subject to an order under the procedural rule.
Secondly, even if the claimant is sufficiently corporate for the purposes of either jurisdiction, both are
aimed only at such of those bodies as are impecunious. The statute frames this criterion as, “unable
to pay the defendant's costs if successful in his defence ” [my italics] whereas the procedural rule
requires that, “[the respondent] will be unable to pay the defendant's costs if ordered to do so ” [my
italics]. The procedural formulation, as might be expected, better reflects the modern approach to
issue-based costs; the statute arguably precluding security where, although a costs order of some
kind can be anticipated against the claimant, the defendant is likely only to be partially successful in
the defence.
Whether the costs order against which protection is sought is a single award or not, the phraseology
of both jurisdictions raises further questions about the extent of impecuniosity required. Companies
Act 1862 s.69, referred to *C.J.Q. 474 the company's assets being “insufficient to pay his costs”
rather than focussing attention, as does the modern wording of both jurisdictions, on the ability to pay
(possibly caused by sufficient, but illiquid, assets). Impecuniosity, then, in both cases, now anticipates
illiquidity short of technical insolvency.
It is not surprising, however, that attempts have been made to exploit the distinction between
individuals and corporate entities by assigning causes of action from companies to individuals;
thereby successfully avoiding the risk of a security for costs award on this basis of impecuniosity.18 A
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further complication where a company is illiquid but not insolvent arises in a different context: whilst
applications for interim payments by companies are rare,19 might a small claimant company with
restricted cash flow applying for such a payment be taken to have admitted impecuniosity sufficiently
to be met by a cross-application for security?20 Or could a claimant arguing in opposition to a security
application that its impecuniosity was due to the defendant's failure to pay disputed sums, be
criticised for failing to remedy the situation by seeking an interim payment?21 These are unanswered
questions: what follows is an exploration of the extent of the statutory jurisdiction and, from 2000, its
interaction with the procedural jurisdiction such that, albeit on the verge of extinction, the statutory
jurisdiction exerted and continues to exert control over the CPR rule.
The statutory jurisdiction
The Companies Act 1985 s.726(1)22 provides, until repealed, that where in England and Wales
(sub-s.(2) providing for proceedings taking place in Scotland23 ),
*C.J.Q. 475 “a limited company is a plaintiff in an action or other legal proceeding, the court having
jurisdiction in the matter may, if it appears by credible testimony that there is reason to believe that
the company will be unable to pay the defendant's costs if successful in his defence, require sufficient
security to be given for those costs, and may stay24 all proceedings until the security is given”.
The separate parallel procedural jurisdiction of CPR r.25.13(2)(c) was created in April 2000.25
Other grounds for awards of security for costs also appeared in RSC Ord.23 r.1, which was expressly
“without prejudice” to statutory provisions covering the same ground. Despite arguments to the
contrary in Greenwich Ltd v National Westminster Bank Plc, 26 the statute does not constrain the
award of security against companies on any of these other grounds (now found in CPR r.25.13).
The overlap between the statutory and procedural jurisdictions
Although CPR Pt 49 treats, “proceedings under the Companies Act 1985” as specialist proceedings to
be commenced (CPR PD 49: (Applications Under the Companies Acts and Related Legislation)
para.5) by Pt 8 claim form in the Companies Court or Chancery Division, the statutory jurisdiction to
award security operates as an interlocutory (“interim”) application for what is now an “interim remedy”.
Like RSC Ord.23 r.1, CPR r.25.13(1)(b) excepts all statutory jurisdictions,27 allowing the court to
award security in any case where, “an enactment permits the court to require security for costs”,
although there is a further precondition (in addition to CPR Pt 1) that, “[the court] is satisfied, having
regard to all the circumstances of the case, that it is just to make such an order”. CPR r.25.13(2)(c)
then creates the separate procedural jurisdiction--always assuming it is “just” to make the order--if,
“the claimant is a company or other body (whether incorporated inside or outside Great Britain) and
there is reason to believe that it will be unable to pay the defendant's costs if ordered to do so”.
For the same issue to be covered both by statutory and procedural powers is not unique. For
example, Companies Act 1985 s.72528 provides, until it, too *C.J.Q. 476 is repealed, for service on
domestic companies differing from the provisions in CPR Pt 6, although methods of service
prescribed in other enactments are similarly excepted.29
The oddity about CPR r.25.13(2)(c), however, is the creation of a parallel jurisdiction on the same
criteria and in very similar wording. That similarity of wording suggests that the intention was to
subsume s.726, for the purpose of court proceedings in England and Wales at least, into the CPR
and, in addition, that there was thought to be no fundamental difference between the two jurisdictions.
The fact that the Companies Act 2006 Sch.16 will repeal s.726 without replacement lends, I suggest,
force to this interpretation.
Despite the distinctions already identified as to the nature of the respondent and the kind of costs
order in respect of which the jurisdiction is available, the two jurisdictions have frequently been
treated as identical30 (and litigants tend, where they can, to apply simultaneously under both).
Nevertheless, the overlap is not complete: in some circumstances only the statutory, or only the
procedural, jurisdiction can be invoked.
Distinctions between the extent of the statutory and the procedural jurisdictions
A clear distinction is, of course, that the statute patently cannot apply to foreign and Northern Irish
limited companies31 whereas the procedural jurisdiction explicitly does.
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*C.J.Q. 477 The procedural jurisdiction, by definition, necessarily extends only to courts governed by
the CPR. Prior to its repeal, then, other fora where costs orders are available but there is no explicit
provision for security must rely on the statutory jurisdiction, which refers in terms to “the court 32
having jurisdiction in the matter” [my italics]. In Abdulhayoglu's Application, 33 for example, it was held
that the Comptroller-General of Patents was not a “court”. Circumstances where the statute provides
coverage where the CPR does not can even be found within the CPR themselves. Part 25, in which
the procedural jurisdiction is found, is disapplied in the small claims track.34 There is nothing to
suggest, however, that this disapplication (by a mere statutory instrument) has any effect on the
statutory jurisdiction, in the rare case that any order for costs is made in a small claim. The small
claims applicant would, however, be obliged to invoke the statutory jurisdiction by using the general
procedures in CPR Pt 23. This may be an extreme reading, but nevertheless, the repeal may deprive
some applicants of a useful jurisdiction in fora to which the CPR do not apply, if remedial steps (as
with the Patents Rules35 ) are not taken.
However, assuming circumstances where the two jurisdictions occupy common ground, in the next
passages I use the wording of the statute as a springboard to discuss the development of the award
from statutory jurisdiction alone to the present situation--pending final repeal of the statutory
jurisdiction--of parallel jurisdictions. This will involve considering the following aspects: counterclaims
and interim applications; standards of proof and the exercise of the discretion.
A plaintiff in an action or other legal proceeding
The questions here are whether either jurisdiction: (a) legitimately applies to counterclaiming
defendants; or (b) extends to awards of security for the costs of interim stages.
The statute unambiguously uses the word “plaintiff”. Nevertheless, in Neck v Taylor, 36 Esher M.R.
made a distinction between: (i) the defendant's counterclaim “in respect of a matter wholly distinct
from the claim”, where *C.J.Q. 478 an award was possible; and (ii) a counterclaim arising out of the
same event as the main claim, in which case the court would consider whether it was a “mere
defence”. The distinction between “real” counterclaims and “mere defences” was more subtle in 1980
in Samuel J Cohl Co v Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd (The Silver Fir), 37 where both parties to
arbitration had applied for security and it was largely coincidental which had instigated the arbitration.
On appeal, mirroring orders were made, Lawton L.J. commenting that, “if the counterclaim is a
defence and nothing more then normally the discretion should not be exercised in favour of ordering
security”38 (my italics).
Whilst it can be inferred that this distinction was an attempt to mitigate the strict words of the statute,
in neither case was the use of the word “plaintiff” in s.726(1) addressed in terms. In Hutchison
Telephone (UK) Ltd v Ultimate Response Ltd, 39 however, Dillon L.J. drew by analogy on the other
grounds in RSC Ord.23, which provided that references to a “plaintiff” intended the person, “in the
position of plaintiff … in the proceeding … including a proceeding on a counterclaim”.
The substantial size of the counterclaim and its effect on the ambit of the evidence and the length of
the trial allowed Dillon L.J. to determine that there was, “more than a mere defence and that security
ought to be given”. For Bingham L.J., it was exercise of the discretion to make the order that was
dependent on characterising the counterclaim as “mere defence” or otherwise,
“even though a counterclaiming defendant may technically be ordered to give security for the costs of
a plaintiff against whom he counterclaims, such an order should not ordinarily be made if all the
defendant is doing in substance, is to defend himself … is the defendant simply defending himself, or
is he going beyond mere self-defence and launching a cross-claim with an independent vitality of its
own?”40
There was, therefore, jurisdiction under the statute to make an order against a defendant (at least if
the defendant had actually filed a pleading entitled “counterclaim”) but subject to the operation of a
discretion at two levels: first, that if the so-called counterclaim was a “mere defence” discretion would
“normally” or “ordinarily” be exercised against the award and secondly, that the court retained an
overall discretion to make an order and to determine the amount.
This liberal approach to the identification of a “plaintiff” informs CT Bowring & Co (Insurance) Ltd v
Corsi and Partners Ltd, 41 in which the statutory use of the expressions “plaintiff” and “other
proceedings” permitted an award in an application under Companies Act 1985 s.459. Holding that
proceedings not brought by writ were “other proceedings”, the Court of Appeal in Unisoft, *C.J.Q. 479
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Re (No.1) 42 similarly concluded that “plaintiff” included any person who had instituted originating
process (even if formally a “petitioner”).43 The restriction of “proceedings” to originating process also,
of course, justifies the housing of statutory applications for security outside CPR Pt 49.
In CT Bowring, 44 however, an additional factor was present as the plaintiff sought security only for the
costs of an application against it for damages under the cross-undertaking attached to a Mareva
injunction.45 Security was refused on the ground that s.726 could not apply to interlocutory
proceedings, but, by the time of appeal, the plaintiff sought also to rely on an alleged inherent
jurisdiction46 and other grounds. Dillon L.J. reiterated the distinction between “counterclaim” and
“mere defence”, in the latter case there being a rule of practice that the plaintiff took the risk of the
defendant's impecuniosity:
“Although the word counterclaim is not used in s 726 or any of its predecessors--no doubt because
the counterclaim, as we have long known it, did not exist as a form of procedure in 1857 or 1862--it is
clear that an impecunious company which makes a counterclaim which is more than a mere
formulation of its defence can be ordered to give security for the plaintiff's costs of the counterclaim.”47
On the matter at issue, however, he held that “plaintiff” did not include the applicant in interlocutory
proceedings, otherwise,
“chaos would reign, for every time an interlocutory application was taken out by a defendant the
plaintiff would be able to say ‘The plaintiff is in the position of the defendant in this application and the
defendant is in *C.J.Q. 480 the position of the plaintiff. They are proceedings. Therefore I ought to
have security for the costs of this application.”’48
Consequently, whilst “plaintiff” in the statute does not necessarily mean “plaintiff”; “an action or other
proceedings” always means originating proceedings.49 The position of the “mere defendant”, at risk of
a discretion to make the order in The Silver Fir 50 and Hutchison 51 but apparently not in CT Bowring,
52 is less clear. If the more liberal Hutchison 53 approach is taken, then why should the order be
confined to those who have filed a formal counterclaim? A “mere defendant” who has relied on an
exclusion clause; tender; prior compromise or set-off without filing a counterclaim adds new issues
and new costs to the dispute which could legitimately be protected by security.54
Whilst suggesting that it might be useful for there to be a jurisdiction to award security,
“if it appears that the defendant is making a case of doubtful validity or putting forward what appear to
be excessive or extravagant claims”,
Dillon L.J. nevertheless declined to award security on any of the additional grounds relied on.
Millet L.J. identified additional practical reasons not to allow the award in interlocutory proceedings:
“If the plaintiff's argument in the present case is right, only the defendant could obtain an order for
security for costs of the entire proceedings; but if he applied for such an order the plaintiff could
immediately apply for security for costs of the defendant's application--and so ad infinitum, each
application for security provoking a cross-application for security for that application.”55
Scott L.J. in Unisoft 56 had relied on the definition of “plaintiff” in the Judicature Acts. Millett L.J.,
however, was not prepared to do so, justifying the emerging wide reading of the statutory use of
“plaintiff” and narrow reading of “proceedings” to which I have referred above on the basis that RSC
Ord.23, unlike the statutory jurisdiction was bound by definitions of “plaintiff” and “action” in Supreme
Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act 1925 s.225 and its predecessors:
*C.J.Q. 481 “Accordingly, the word ‘action’ in O 23, r 1(1) has a wider meaning than the same word
in s 726, and the scope of the expression ‘other proceeding in the High Court’ is correspondingly
reduced.”57
Despite this, Millett L.J. reached the same result: even under RSC Ord.23, interlocutory proceedings
were excluded. The defendant had no “independent cause of action” to recover the damages sought:
it could not have sued for them otherwise than in connection with the cross-undertaking. Millett L.J.
was at one with Dillon L.J. that there was no inherent jurisdiction but suggested that if the claim for an
inquiry as to damages was an abuse of process: “[the court] has power … to put the defendant on
terms; and these may include the provision of security for costs”. Not only does CPR Pt 3 now
explicitly permit security for costs to be awarded (against any party, “mere defendant” or not) by way
of conditional order or as a sanction,58 but, as the security may be, “for any sum payable by that party
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to any other party in the proceedings”,59 I suggest that there is no reason why the security provided
should not represent the costs of an interim application.60
This was the somewhat strained position then, in April 2000, when the parallel procedural jurisdiction
was introduced. By virtue of the expression “a new procedural code” in CPR Pt 1, there was the
opportunity to detach the CPR jurisdiction from any pre-existing definitions in the statute or its
associated case law.
CPR r.25.12(1) provides that, “[a] defendant to any claim may apply under this Section of this Part for
security for his costs of the proceedings ” (my italics). Neither expression is defined in CPR r.2.3(1)
although the definition of “claim for personal injuries” implies originating process.61 Security for costs
under Pt 25 is, then, security for the costs only of the substantive proceedings. Security for the costs
of an appeal from an interim application, may, however, be awarded by virtue of CPR r.25.15.62
*C.J.Q. 482 On the subject of counterclaims, however, the CPR position appears much simpler. CPR
r.20.3, expressly cross-referred in CPR r.25.12(1), provides that a counterclaim, “shall be treated as if
it were a claim for the purposes of these Rules”.63 If a counterclaim, even if no more in fact than a
“mere defence” is assimilated entirely to a claim for the purposes of the CPR--so “dealing with the
parties on an equal footing” 64 --then, is there any longer any need for the taxonomic distinction
created to soften the statutory wording?
Apparently so. Hutchison 65 was applied in Pimlott v Meregrove Holdings Ltd. 66 Judge Spencer Q.C.
refused security as, “[i]nsofar as the set-off has the capacity to extinguish the claim it is a [mere]
defence”. Having so determined, he also found that there were no additional costs involved in
defending the Pt 20 counterclaim in any event.
At approximately the same time, in Anglo Petroleum Ltd v TFB (Mortgages) Ltd, 67 Park J. also
refused security on the basis that the “mere defence” mirrored the claim:
“It sometimes happens that a single underlying dispute between two persons gives rise to two
actions: one sues the other. There might be a claim and counterclaim within one legal action; there
might be two separate actions…. A sues B; B defends A's claim. B also sues A and A defends B's
claim. Essentially each says the same thing in each case. So the ground on which B defends A's
claim is also the ground on which B sues A; and the ground on which A sues B is also the ground on
which A defends B's claim…. Now let me add the further assumption that A is impecunious but B is
wealthy. If the court ordered A to provide … security, A could not provide it. But, … it would not make
much sense for the court to make the order. Suppose that the court did make the order and A failed to
provide the security. The court would stay A's claim against B. But B's claim against A is still on foot
and when B brings it to trial, A can defend it. The court has no power to order a defendant to provide
security for costs.68 In my example, A could, and presumably would, defend B's claim by advancing
essentially the same arguments as those which he, A, wanted to advance in his own claim. It would,
in my view, be largely pointless for the court to have ordered A to provide security for the costs of his
own claim.”69
*C.J.Q. 483 Subsequently, in Thistle Hotels Ltd v Orb Estates Plc, 70 where the claimant applied
under CPR r.25.12 for security for the costs of counterclaims both on the ground of impecuniosity and
foreign residence, Neck, 71 Hutchison 72 and CT Bowring 73 were all considered. The test applied was
adapted from Bingham L.J.'s speech in Hutchison, 74 to the effect that,
“once the applicant had shown that the case fell within one of the classes specified by the rules of
court, it was ‘a largely discretionary area’ (part of the issue whether it was just and right) whether an
order for security was to be made against a counterclaiming defendant”,75
whilst requiring,
“the substance of each claim to be considered and whether, and if so how far, the counterclaim
enlarges the ambit of the action in terms of issues, time and costs”.76
After a careful examination of the facts on this pragmatic rather than taxonomic basis, an order was
made.
The existence of costs specifically attributable to the defence of the counterclaim, even where it is a
“mere defence”, has been treated as a significant factor (see Hutchison 77 and Pimlott 78 above), as
otherwise, the claimant could, clearly, obtain what it could not obtain otherwise: security for its own
costs of bringing its claim against the defendant.79 Indeed, I suggest that this factor has become so
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intertwined with the concept of a “mere defence” that it has become part of the definition; a “mere
defence” being characterised as a defence or counterclaim which does not involve additional costs. If,
as in Hart Investments Ltd v Larchpark, 80 the counterclaim has, “an independent vitality of its own”,81
it will almost necessarily carry with it some additional investigative and probative cost. But it remains
possible to imagine a vigorous, independent, vital defence that could be raised in legal argument only,
as, for *C.J.Q. 484 example, an allegation of lack of privity, where the additional costs might be
minimal. Indeed, in an extreme case, where it is, as in Jones v Environcom Ltd, 82 the counterclaim
which is the most significant, allowing the main claim to be discontinued, this might justify an award
not limited to the additional costs of the counterclaim.
Neither Lawton L.J. in The Silver Fir 83 (“normally”) nor Dillon L.J. in Hutchison 84 (“ordinarily”) had, in
fact, imposed a bar on security being exceptionally awarded in the case of a “mere defence” (and
therefore, by implication, cases in which the claimant faced no additional costs burden).85
The procedural jurisdiction has, then, inherited a considerable degree of complexity as a result of
absorbing these attempts to soften the statutory wording. Taken on its own terms, the procedural
jurisdiction clearly permits an award on a pleaded counterclaim as a result of Pt 20, the question
whether it is a “mere defence” or whether it involves identifiable additional costs logically going to the
discretion to make an award and as to the amount of that award. Part 3 would permit security for
costs to be awarded in some interim applications. The outstanding problem to which case law derived
from the statutory jurisdiction might assist is, then, the case in which no formal counterclaim has been
pleaded. As we have seen, if the threshold is the pragmatic one of a defendant incurring additional
costs, there is no reason why the award should be confined to circumstances in which a counterclaim
has to be pleaded.
May if it appears by credible testimony that there is reason to believe that the company will be
unable to pay the defendant's costs if successful in his defence …
The test for impecuniosity is, in CPR r.25.13(3)(c ) expressed in modern, straightforward language.
Nevertheless, it adopts from the statute the rider that there should be “reason to believe” in the
claimant's impecuniosity. The statute insists in addition that such “reason to believe” should be
grounded in “credible testimony”. The question arises, therefore, of the effect of either phrase on the
standard of proof.
In 1973, in Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd v Triplan Ltd, Denning M.R. relied on the word “may” in the
section to create a discretion to make the award under the statute:
“Turning now to the words of the statute, the important word is ‘may’. That gives the judge a discretion
whether to order security or not. There is no burden one way or the other. It is a discretion to be
exercised in *C.J.Q. 485 all the circumstances of the case…. If there is reason to believe that the
company cannot pay the costs, then security may be ordered, but not must be ordered.”86
Cairns L.J. thought that the discretion operated only in “special circumstances”, but Lawton L.J.
agreed with Denning M.R. that:
“[The] discretion ought not to be hampered by any special rules or regulations, nor ought it to be put
into a straitjacket by considerations of burden of proof.”87
Similar considerations were utilised by Dillon L.J. in Europa Holdings Ltd v Circle Industries (UK) Ltd,
88 as means of tempering, not the discretion, but the underlying jurisdiction in the case of a struggling
small company. He emphasised that the statutory jurisdiction arose only if,
“there is reason to believe that the company will (and I stress that the word is will and not may ) be
unable to pay the defendant's costs”.89
Consequently, the order was not made because the plaintiff had made efforts to “keep afloat” during a
lengthy depression and there was evidence that it was, “a solvent and apparently well-managed and
prudently managed company” with a genuine claim.90
Approximately two months later, in Unisoft (No.2), Re 91 Nicholls V.C. considered the phrase “credible
testimony”, concluding that it did not “water down” the basic test inherent in the statutory jurisdiction
whether the company would, at the time of the future costs order against it, be unable to pay:92
“The court, on the basis of credible testimony must have ‘reason to believe’, that is, to accept, ‘that
the company will be unable to pay’. If this were not so, and the test is not whether the court, on the
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basis of credible testimony, believes the company will be unable to pay, then it is difficult to identify
what is the proper approach and what is the test being prescribed by the statute. It cannot, surely,
suffice that the applicant's *C.J.Q. 486 accountant, for example, who is a credible witness, puts
forward a case of inability to pay.”93
The reference to “credible testimony”, then, adds nothing to the normal requirement to evaluate all the
evidence.
If “reason to believe it will be unable” means no more than “will be unable”, there seems no obvious
reason why that phrase should be retained in the statute or inherited by the procedural jurisdiction.
The expression “reason to believe” appears only in this and one other of the grounds for the order
expressed in CPR r.25.13(2).94
In Marine Blast v Targe Towing Ltd, 95 Mance L.J., specifically considering the phrase as used in the
CPR said:
“This is not an occasion on which one can determine whether or not, as a matter of probability, it will
pay. The question is whether there is reason to believe that it will be unable to pay. I think that test is
satisfied.”96
Mance L.J.'s comment was subsequently treated, in Mbasogo v Logo Ltd, 97 as defining the standard
of proof as less than a balance of probabilities. This approach was explicitly approved and Unisoft
(No.2), Re 98 not followed in Aerotel Ltd v Wavecrest Group Enterprises Ltd, 99 also applying the
procedural rule.
On that basis, the burden for the applicant in respect of CPR r.25.13(2)(a), (d), (e) and (g) is that of
the balance of probabilities whilst that of the statute and of r.25.13(2)(c) and (f), as a result of the
inclusion of the words “reason to believe”, is the lower threshold of what was described by Buxton L.J.
in Phillips v Symes, 100 as a “significant danger”. The use of inexact verbal expressions of probability
has the potential to create much confusion and potential for misunderstanding.101 In a very small and
entirely unscientific survey of 45 *C.J.Q. 487 lawyers and non-lawyers within my own department,
both “reason to believe” (67 per cent) and “significant danger” (78 per cent) were regarded--taken as
phrases without any context--by the vast majority of respondents as indicating a greater than 50 per
cent likelihood.
The matter came to a head in 2008 in Jirehouse Capital v Beller, 102 where Unisoft (No.2), Re 103 was
subjected to careful analysis by Arden L.J. Counsel had argued that CPR r.25.13(2)(c) demanded a
standard of proof, that of a balance of probabilities, higher than that of the “significant danger”
applicable under the statute. This suggestion was rejected and Aerotel 104 held to be wrong,
“there is a critical difference between a conclusion that there is ‘reason to believe’ that the company
will not be able to pay costs ordered against it and a conclusion that it has been proved that the
company will not be able to pay costs ordered against it. In the former case, there is no need to reach
a final conclusion as to what will probably happen. In the latter case, a conclusion has to be reached
on the balance of probabilities…. the Vice Chancellor in Unisoft did not lay down any test on the
balance of probabilities.”105
In addition, Arden L.J. considered that Buxton L.J. had not intended “significant danger” to indicate a
different test, although,
“that said, there may be contexts in which a test of significant danger does produce a different result
from ‘reason to believe’ and so it would be much safer to use the statutory words in future”.106
This distinction, between current fact and speculation as to a future inability to pay then justifies the
distinct approach in r.25.13(2)(c) and (f), the latter also referring to a future inability to pay (by a
nominal claimant). Here, assimilation of the statutory words and related case law into the procedural
arena is, although it has taken eight years to do so, vindicated.
A final excursion into the semantics of the two jurisdictions relates, once impecuniosity has been
established, to the exercise of the discretion. Where the statute is invoked in proceedings to which the
CPR apply,107 CPR r.25.13(1), demands not only that it should be “just” to make the order but that the
court should be “satisfied” that it is so.108 This might reasonably, I suggest, *C.J.Q. 488 appear to, for
example, a litigant in person, a different and more stringent test for the exercise of the discretion than
that required to establish jurisdiction, or than a balance of probabilities, although it is
probably--again--intended to add nothing.
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The exercise of the discretion
Denning M.R. having discerned a discretion to make the order under the statute, a series of criteria
governing its exercise also emerged from Parkinson. 109 The extent of the discretion under the statute
was then aligned with that of the then procedural rules to award security on other grounds by Megarry
V.C. in Pearson v Naydler,
“the word “just” which the judge [in Bilcon Ltd v Fegmay Investments Ltd 110 ] took from RSC Ord 23 r
1, does not in fact appear in section 447; but it seems to be to be an entirely appropriate term to apply
in a case where Parliament has not laid down any express criteria for exercising the discretionary
power”.111
A number of factors then fall to be discussed in the present context: the criteria by which that
discretion is exercised and the relevance to it (or otherwise) of issues such as the merits of the case
and whether the additional filters now placed on the statutory jurisdiction by CPR Pt 1 in particular
render earlier case law based entirely on the statute obsolete. The possibility of preventing an order
by a claim that it would “stifle” a legitimate defence, or of using CPR Pt 3 to overturn an order by
seeking relief against sanctions are also significant in understanding the interplay between the
procedural and statutory jurisdictions.
Factors in the exercise of the discretion
In Pearson, 112 Megarry V.C. identified the following factors in applying Parkinson 113 to a statutory
claim:
• The impecuniosity of the company goes not simply to the existence of the jurisdiction to make the
order but is also “a substantial factor” in the decision to exercise the discretion to do so.
*C.J.Q. 489 • However the order must not be used as “an instrument of oppression”, for example,
stifling a genuine claim by a small company.
• But the court must not be so reluctant to make the order that an impecunious company can use its
impecuniosity to put “unfair pressure” on its opponent.
• The fact that the co-plaintiff was an individual against whom security could not be ordered did not
preclude the making of the order.114
• An award of two-thirds of the costs incurred to date was an appropriate guideline (factoring in, for
example, litigation risk). This does, of course, assume, a single once and for all costs award.
Insolvent liquidation creates a presumption of impecuniosity115 but is only one factor in exercise of the
discretion.116 For example, in Tripp Ltd v Landor, 117 the fact that the insolvent company had a facility
available to it with its bank (even though the court could not compel the company to draw on it) was
sufficient to prevent security being ordered.
In Cohort Constructions Co (UK) Ltd v Spring Hotels Ltd, Evans L.J. was, however, less confident as
to the irrelevance of the merits of the case:
“Certainly the court must be satisfied that the defence is arguable, or, putting the matter differently,
that the defence gives rise to triable issues … I am not persuaded that it is realistic to ignore the
merits beyond this, for the simple reason that the burden or unfairness to the plaintiff, if an order is
made with which he cannot comply, must depend on the value of the claim which he has to forego,
which depends on its turn on a broad assessment of its chances of success. Similarly the risk for the
defendant of having a costs order in his favour which the plaintiff cannot satisfy must depend on the
chances of such an order being made and therefore on the eventual outcome of the proceedings.”118
The strength of the plaintiff's substantive case did, however, appear to be the deciding factor in the
first instance decision of Turberville Smith Ltd v Turberville Smith 119 where, although there were
prima facie grounds for security, no *C.J.Q. 490 order was made on the grounds of the plaintiff's
“realistic prospect”120 of success against all defendants. Apparently, even a claim “likely to fail” does
not necessarily attract an award provided the intentions of the claimant are good, Anglo Petroleum
Ltd v TFB (Mortgages) Ltd :
“If a claim is a genuine claim, seriously pursued, a court should in general resist being swayed
towards ordering security for costs on the ground that, as the court sees it at the time of the
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application for security, the claim is likely to fail in the end.”121
And the prospects of success appear to have even less relevance to the procedural jurisdiction to
award security for the costs of an appeal:
“It is implicit in the whole jurisdiction to award security for the costs of an appeal that the appeal may
fail; and it is seldom that the prospects of success on an appeal are relevant and very seldom, if ever,
that they are determinative.”122
Stifling a legitimate claim
Where the merits of the case hold distinct significance, however, is in circumstances where the
claimant as respondent to the application alleges that awarding security would stifle its legitimate
claim. It is a paradox arising from the fact the jurisdictions are based on impecuniosity that,
“the court [has] power to order the company to do what it is likely to find difficulty in doing, namely to
provide security for the costs which ex hypothesi it is likely to be unable to pay”.123
This was, however, described as a non sequitur by Saville J. in Flender Werft AG v Aegean Maritime
Ltd. 124 In his view:
“A great deal of international business is conducted through offshore or shell companies with no or no
apparent assets but with legal or beneficial owners or financial backers well able to provide the
necessary funds … including … the investment needed for litigating or arbitrating claims made by
those companies. To my mind, particularly where commercial entities are involved, any argument that
an order for security will stifle a claim is likely to fail in limine, unless the court is persuaded that in
truth it *C.J.Q. 491 is at least more likely than not that funds are not available from any source to
provide or support security.”125
Whilst the hurdle set (“more likely than not”) is not a high one--albeit higher than the test for
establishing the jurisdiction--this is, I suggest, very much a Commercial Court view, in contrast to the
sympathy shown to a private, apparently sole-director company by the Chancery Division in Pearson,
126 or to the single mother who had offered the claimant almost all her savings towards satisfying the
award in Mini-Lux Ltd v Panasonic (UK) Ltd. 127
There has been, however, a debate about the extent to which the respondent need adduce evidence
of its own impecuniosity in support of its stifling claim. In Trident International Freight Services Ltd v
Manchester Ship Canal Co, 128 citing both Parkinson 129 and Pearson, 130 the Court of Appeal held that
it was not essential:
“It would be pointless to insist on the company putting in evidence in order effectively to admit that
which the defendant effectively asserts. Nor can any objection reasonably be taken because the
plaintiff's counsel does not in terms submit that, if security is ordered, it will or may be unable to
pursue the proceedings. That submission is implicit in the plaintiff's resistance of the application.”131
Nevertheless, even if no evidence was available from the plaintiff, “probability” rather than “certainty”
of an inability to pursue the proceedings if the award were made was adequate: a comparatively high
test, and higher both than that proposed by the Commercial Court in Flender Werft 132 (“more likely
than not”) and, as we have seen, than that for establishing the jurisdiction in the first place. Peter
Gibson L.J., however, in Keary Developments Ltd v Tarmac Construction Ltd 133 questioned this
assumption:
“it seems to me that there are two quite separate questions which are relevant. One is whether the
condition for the application of s 726 is *C.J.Q. 492 satisfied. That requires the court to look ahead to
the conclusion of the case to see whether the plaintiff would be able to meet an order for costs. On
that the [plaintiff]134 accepting the applicability of the section, need put in no evidence. The other
question which is relevant, given that an application for security is made at a stage when the trial will
not have occurred, is whether the plaintiff company will be prevented from pursuing its litigation if an
order for security is made against it. On this, evidence from the [plaintiff]135 may be needed. The
considerations affecting those two questions seem to me to be rather different. For example, a backer
might well be prepared to put up money to assist a company to pursue a case when the trial has not
yet occurred, but the same backer would be extremely unlikely to put up money after the trial has
been unsuccessfully concluded against the company.”136
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He went on to identify the following factors affecting the interaction of the discretion with a stifling
defence:
• Following Parkinson, 137 there was a complete discretion to be exercised in the light of all the
circumstances.
• The “possibility or probability” that an award would deter the plaintiff from proceeding was not
“without more” a reason to dismiss the application.
• The court must,
“carry out a balancing exercise. On the one hand it must weigh the injustice to the plaintiff if prevented
from pursuing a proper claim by an order for security. Against that it must weigh the injustice to the
defendant if no security is ordered … it will also be concerned not to be so reluctant to order security
that it becomes a weapon whereby the impecunious company can use its inability to pay costs as a
means of putting unfair pressure on the more prosperous company.”138
• The plaintiff's prospects of success form part of the circumstances but will not be investigated unless
there is “a high degree of probability of success or failure”.
• Whilst a payment in might acknowledge that the claim had merit, it might be made on a nuisance
value basis from which no such inference could be drawn. (Presumably now the existence of Pt 36
offers by either party might be considered under this head.)139
*C.J.Q. 493 • The award need not be of a substantial amount as long as it is not nominal.
• As to stifling, the court must be “satisfied that, in all the circumstances, it is probable that the claim
would be stifled”. Despite Trident, in most cases evidence would be required. The court should,
however, consider whether the company could obtain funds from third parties such as shareholders,
directors or investors to continue the litigation. The burden of producing evidence that this was
impossible was on the plaintiff.140 In Inplus Group Ltd v Pyke, 141 however, it was argued that the
effect of Strasbourg jurisprudence, at least in the case of applications for security of the costs of an
appeal under CPR r.25.15 (that is, necessarily an invocation of a procedural jurisdiction), involved
deeper consideration of the merits of the case and that there was no obligation on the claimant to
provide evidence as to stifling and its rights under *C.J.Q. 494 ECHR art.6 to have access to justice.
Neither argument found favour with Brooke L.J.142
• The lateness of the application, whose fault such lateness was, the fact that the plaintiff143 has
already incurred costs in anticipation that an application for security would not be made and the costs
to be incurred144 were all relevant, as was the fact that costs and trial length had now increased and
new evidence that companies under the same directorship had gone into liquidation when substantial
claims they were making had failed.
In Danemark v BAA, 145 applying the Keary 146 principles, the link between the stifling argument and
the lateness of the application and costs of trial was further developed:
“Where such an order is sought very late in the day, the result of that exercise is not likely to favour
the defendant, for the costs left to be incurred are likely to be proportionately small when compared to
the plaintiff's claim, including his costs to date and any security he may already have given.”147
Whilst this might be right when the parties are very close to trial, there is, of course a tipping point
before then when costs begin to escalate substantially. At or before that point, one might suggest
that, on the same logic, the timing should favour the defendant.
Stifling and third-party funding
The interaction of the security jurisdiction with the possibility of third-party funding, as with the
interaction between the security jurisdiction and interim payments, raises further questions. Requiring
third-party backers who might be individuals to provide security might, for example, be thought to
abrogate the principle that security is not available on the basis of individual impecuniosity (still less
on the basis of someone else's impecuniosity). Supreme Court Act 1981 s.51, nevertheless allows for
costs orders ex post facto against third-party funders of litigation, raising the possibility that a third
party funder whose *C.J.Q. 495 backing allows the litigation to continue despite the award of security
at an early stage renders him- or herself additionally liable to such a costs order at a later one. So, in
Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras (No.4), 148 the existence of an (ultimately inadequate)
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security for costs order was a factor but did not prevent a third party costs order subsequently being
made against a funder of the litigation.149 Indeed, in Longstaff International Ltd v Baker & McKenzie,
150 the impecuniosity of a foreign claimant was relied on under CPR r.25.13(2). The claimant, which
was illiquid, owned a subsidiary, which undertook to meet the claimant's liability in costs. Unisoft
(No.2), Re 151 and Thistle 152 were cited as authority for the proposition that the time at which the
decision had to be made was as at the speculative time of the final costs order and that a net asset
balance was not determinative because the liquidity of the claimant had to be considered. Park J.,
expressly treating the position under the CPR and under the Companies Act 1985 as identical, held
that,
“[a] case cannot be taken out of sub-paragraph c) by saying that, although the claimant company will
be unable to pay the defendant's costs, some other person will”.
The offer of security by Redwell was taken not only as an admission of the claimant's impecuniosity
but also as a concession that, “it is just that some form of security should be ordered”; an additional
risk undertaken by the third party backer in offering security.
CPR Part 1 and relief against sanctions
The question of the amount of security, bearing in mind that one sum might stifle a meritorious claim
whilst a lesser one might not, was regarded as a starting point under the statutory jurisdiction in
Cohort Constructions Co (UK) Ltd v Spring Hotels Ltd. 153 This case also marks the first leakage of
what was, two years later, to become CPR Pt 1, into the court's approach to the statute; not here as
to the “justice” aspect already well-established at common law, but as to speed, economy and active
case management.154 Case management is *C.J.Q. 496 relevant because it defines the scope of the
trial, the costs of which it is sought to protect by security. Evans L.J. identified two principles to be
adopted in cases where the costs were “out of scale” with the issues in dispute,
“first, the issues should be carefully identified so that the proceedings can be limited to those which
really matter; secondly the costs or proposed costs should be scrutinised so that they do not become
disproportionate to the amounts which realistically are in dispute”.155
It has, however, been suggested that pre-1999 case law governing the exercise of the discretion
should be disregarded,156 although, as we have seen, pre-1999 case law as to the meaning and
extent of the statutory jurisdiction has informed and consistently been applied to its procedural
equivalent. Nevertheless, in Hammond Suddard Solicitors v Agrichem International Holdings Ltd, 157
Keary 158 was referred to in the following terms,
“although that case was decided before the advent of the CPR, the principles in it are relevant to the
determination of any case in which the appellant asserts that an order for security for costs (or an
order for security for costs above a certain amount) will stifle an appeal”.159
In Sinclair Investment Holdings SA v Cushnie, 160 the applicant was obliged to rely only on the
procedural jurisdiction, as the claimant was a foreign company. Mann J. was concerned that attempts
were being made to cost the claimant out of the proceedings and considered that security was
premature, but, again, applied the Keary 161 principles in so doing. The issue, I suggest, is not that of
the discretion per se, that having been discerned by Denning M.R. and confirmed by Megarry V.C. as
identical to the existing procedural “just to do so” filter, but the effect of CPR Pt 1, now governing both
jurisdictions. The effect of the case law is, I suggest, to regard CPR Pt 1 as a supplement to the
pre-1999 and statutory case law, rather than as superseding it.
Possibly more significant, however, is the effect of CPR Pt 3, which I have already identified as
possibly allowing for the award of security for the costs of an interim application by way of general
sanction. CPR Pt 3, however, also introduced provision for relief against sanctions from 1999 which
then also apply to *C.J.Q. 497 the statutory jurisdiction in proceedings governed by the CPR. The
sanction, of course, when an order for security is made, is that if the security is not provided, the
claimant's action is stayed with the risk of being struck out. So, in Mini-Lux Ltd v Panasonic (UK) Ltd
162 the claimant's impecuniosity was the only stated reason for its failure to comply with the order and
relief was given to prevent strike out of the substantive claim once the criteria in CPR r.3.9 were
applied.
Conclusion
An examination of the wording of the statute on its own terms, then, demonstrates a number of
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differences between the Victorian statutory jurisdiction and the modern procedural jurisdiction: it
applies to different categories of business entity; arguably to different types of costs order; and to
wider categories of proceedings (including, in principle, small claims otherwise falling under the CPR).
The words “credible testimony” in the statute appear to add nothing and the discretion extracted from
case law is confirmed by the procedural, “just to do so” superimposed on the statutory jurisdiction in
proceedings to which the CPR apply. Case law derived from the statute, particularly as to its
application to interim applications and counterclaims, is applied without question to the procedural
jurisdiction even though, in the case of counterclaims at least, a simpler route to much the same end
could be found in CPR Pt 20. The distinctions between counterclaims and “mere defences” employed
in that case law is, I suggest, also at odds with a pragmatic approach to costs more consistent with
the tenor of the CPR. Further, the CPR allow both for imposition of security for costs awards in other
circumstances as sanctions and for relief against the sanction for a failure to provide the security.
The question of impecuniosity straddles both limbs of both jurisdictions but with very different burdens
of proof: less than the balance of probabilities in order to find sufficient impecuniosity to establish
jurisdiction but a test of “more likely than not” or even “probability” of the same impecuniosity to justify
refusing an order on the ground it would stifle a legitimate claim.
The complexity of factors considered in exercise of the discretion, however, suggests that a
codification of the accretion of glosses, interpretations and criteria actually employed, even if a
non-exhaustive list, might usefully be added to the procedural rule, on the model of a similar list in
CPR r.3.9, for the sake not only of my notional litigant in person but even for lawyers seeking
realistically to understand and advise on the prospects of success of such an application.
Mourn or rejoice? The repeal of the statute will make no substantial difference to the way in which the
procedural jurisdiction has been and is exercised; the effect of the statute on the procedural
jurisdiction being, and as a result of continued recourse to its case law, I suggest, too ingrained.
Outside the ambit of the CPR, there may still be cause to reflect on the passing of a useful procedural
manoeuvre.
I am grateful to Professor Adrian Walters for helpful comment and discussion on this paper and to the
45 members of the law school's staff who responded with alacrity and enthusiasm to the small survey
I refer to in this paper. The law and procedure stated is believed to be up to date to January 2009
(including the 48th amendment to the CPR).
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